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Abstract We analyze how budgetary institutions affect government budget deficits in mem-
ber states of the European Union during 1984–2003 employing new indicators provided by
Hallerberg et al. (2009). Using panel fixed effects models, we examine whether the impact of
budgetary institutions on budget deficits is conditioned by political fragmentation (i.e., ide-
ological differences among parties in government) and size fragmentation (i.e., the effective
number of parties in government or the number of spending ministers). Our results suggest
that strong budgetary institutions, no matter whether they are based on delegation to a strong
minister of finance or on fiscal contracts, reduce the deficit bias in case of strong ideological
fragmentation. In contrast, the impact of budgetary institutions is not conditioned by size
fragmentation.




Fiscal policies of the member states of the European Union (EU) diverge substantially.
Whereas, for instance, gross debt ratios in Belgium and Italy exceeded 100 % of GDP in
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2008, the debt-to-GDP ratio of Denmark amounted to 40 % (source: OECD 2009). There is
a broad consensus that the variation in fiscal performance across countries cannot be fully
explained by differences in the economic environment. Numerous studies therefore exam-
ined the extent to which institutional and political factors might explain these differences
in fiscal policy outcomes. One such factor is budgetary institutions, i.e., the formal and
informal rules governing budgetary decisions of the executive and legislative branches of
government (Hallerberg et al. 2009). Various studies have attempted to measure the quality
of budgetary institutions by defining quantitative indices and to examine their effect on fiscal
performance.
An important reason why budgetary institutions may matter for fiscal policy is the so-
called common pool problem. Individual politicians (or parties) will support increases in
targeted spending that provide their constituencies with more public services. As this spend-
ing will be financed by general taxes, their constituencies only pay a fraction of the total
costs, resulting in a spending and deficit bias (Velasco 2000). Indeed, there is evidence
suggesting that so-called size fragmentation (i.e., the effective number of parties in govern-
ment or the number of spending ministers) affects fiscal policy (cf. Perotti and Kontopoulos
2002). Budgetary institutions may impose fiscal discipline, thereby reducing the spending
and deficit bias due to the common pool problem.
Another reason why budgetary institutions may affect fiscal policy outcomes is that by
providing the ‘rules of the game’ they can mitigate the impact of ideological differences
within governments. For instance, if political parties forming a coalition government have
different ideologies, budgetary institutions offer a framework for policymaking that can
reduce the potentially negative impact of political fragmentation (Volkerink and de Haan
2001).
According to Hallerberg et al. (2007, 2009), there are two ideal forms of budgetary in-
stitutions, namely delegation and contracts. Under delegation, the finance minister is vested
with significant decision-making powers, while under contracts political parties enter an
agreement to commit themselves strictly to budgetary targets set for one or several years.
Both ideal forms of fiscal governance centralize the budget process, but the effectiveness of
these budgetary institutions depends on the characteristics of the political system. Delegation
to a strong finance minister arguably works best in case of one-party majority governments
or coalition governments with parties that are close to one another ideologically. In contrast,
contracts are expected to be most effective in coalition governments in which parties have
very different ideologies as such parties are generally not willing to delegate fiscal powers
to a strong finance minister who is from a different party.1
Whereas most previous studies analyzing the impact of budgetary institutions on fiscal
policy outcomes focus on the direct effect of budgetary institutions, we examine whether
the impact of budgetary institutions on government budget deficits is conditioned by size
fragmentation and political fragmentation. As we use the indicators of budgetary institu-
tions as constructed by Hallerberg et al. (2009), our analysis is restricted to the ‘old’ EU
member states (except Luxembourg) over the period 1984–2003. Our main findings are that
1However, delegation and contracts are not mutually exclusive. Following Bernheim and Whinston (1986)
we can interpret delegation to a strong minister of finance as a common agency problem in which multiple
principals (the other ministers) delegate fiscal policy to a single agent (the minister of finance). The principals
will try to influence the agent such that he pursues the policy most beneficial to the principal in question. In
a cabinet context, these rent-seeking activities will lead to inefficient use of government resources by the
principals. In order to alleviate the inefficiencies arising from rent-seeking competition Dixit et al. (1997)
suggest that it is optimal to back up delegation to a single agent with an agreement between the principals. In
a fiscal policy context this can be done by means of a fiscal contract.
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budgetary institutions, no matter whether they are based on delegation to a strong minister
of finance or on fiscal contracts, become effective in case of strong ideological fragmenta-
tion. In contrast, the impact of budgetary institutions on the government’s budget deficit is
not conditioned by size fragmentation.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 offers a brief review of the
literature and Sect. 3 formulates our hypotheses. Section 4 describes the data used, while
Sect. 5 contains our empirical results. Section 6 presents a sensitivity analysis. The final
section offers some concluding comments.
2 Literature review2
According to the so-called common pool problem, the financing of a specific type of govern-
ment expenditure is often shared among different interest groups. Therefore, each interest
group has an incentive to free-ride on each other’s contributions. This creates a bias towards
overspending. Whereas Shepsle and Weingast (1981) highlight geographically dispersed
benefits of public spending, von Hagen and Harden (1995) focus on individual spending
ministers. Each minister has an interest in increasing spending, while spreading the cost to
others. A similar argument can be made for the parties in a coalition: each member of the
coalition will support initiatives to raise spending on items favoring their own constituencies
(Perotti and Kontopoulos 2002). These static applications explain expenditure pressures, but
not necessarily a tendency towards budget deficits. Using a dynamic model, Velasco (1999,
2000) shows how the common pool problem may lead to deficits. In his model, the common
pool of tax resources expands to include future generations. The incumbent government can
use these resources by running deficits.3 Various studies report evidence that size fragmen-
tation leads to higher budget deficits (Perotti and Kontopoulos 2002, Woo 2003) and higher
spending (Schaltegger and Feld 2009).
As pointed out by Franzese (2000), political fragmentation within governments also may
lead to deficits. War of attrition models (like Alesina and Drazen 1991) suggest that govern-
ing parties will try to shift the burden of a necessary fiscal adjustment even if they agree that
current debt-levels or persistent deficits require control. Adjustment plans will be harder
to find the more politically fragmented the coalition is. So, given uncertainty among po-
litical parties over how long others will tolerate steadily rising debt, before capitulating
to stabilization plans having distributional implications they dislike, politically fragmented
governments will have a tendency to delay stabilization.4
To what extent can budgetary institutions reduce the deficit bias? Various studies have
addressed this issue for EU countries. Older studies using indicators of budgetary institutions
had to rely on cross-sectional data (see, e.g., von Hagen and Harden 1995; de Haan and
2The first part of this section heavily draws upon Wierts (2008).
3Using a variant of the common pool problem, Tornell and Lane (1999) explain the speedy disappearance of
budgetary surpluses (see also Lane 2003). When the government budget balance is in surplus, the incentive to
act prudently is weak within a fragmented political system, as each party knows that if it refrains from using
the surplus to implement its desired policy, competing parties will do so.
4A third explanation for a deficit bias that will not be dealt with in the present paper refers to the limited time
horizon of politicians (cf. Debrun et al. 2008). Politicians can try winning electoral support by implementing
popular fiscal decisions now (extra spending, lower taxes) while shifting the burden to the future. Buchanan
and Wagner (1977) assume that this is possible because the public does not fully understand the nature of the
intertemporal budget constraint (‘fiscal illusion’). However, also in models assuming rational expectations, a
similar deficit bias may exist (cf. Tabellini and Alesina 1990).
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Sturm 1994).5 However, a few recent studies have examined whether budgetary institutions
affect fiscal policy outcomes in EU member states using indicators of such institutions that
also vary over time.
The first study having a longitudinal element is Hallerberg (2004), who reports that coun-
tries having a so-called fiefdom system end up with larger budget deficits than countries
with delegation, contracts, or a mixed system. Under fiefdom, the decision-making process
is fragmented and ministers dictate their own budgets. In contrast, Tujula and Wolswijk
(2007), who use Hallerberg’s typology, do not find that budgetary institutions affect budget
deficits for their sample of 22 countries over the period 1970–2002.
Annett (2006) estimates a model for a sample of annual data from 1980 to 2004 for
all EU members except Luxembourg, including dummy variables for budgetary institutions
based on delegation and contracts drawn from Hallerberg (2004). The author reports that,
relative to fiefdom, contracts contribute to superior fiscal performance across the sample,
but the same does not hold for delegation. Annett concludes that his finding is at odds with
the claim that both commitment and delegation can be used to internalize the externality
associated with the common pool problem in fiscal policy.
Using data for EU members states over 1985–2004, Hallerberg et al. (2009) find that
delegation matters most for expected delegation states (i.e., countries governed by one-party
governments or politically homogeneous coalitions) and contracts the most for expected
contract states (i.e., countries governed by politically heterogeneous coalitions). Further-
more, case studies suggest that the effectiveness of those institutions can be undermined
by political changes. Institutions promoting a strong role for the finance minister work
when there is a one-party government but become increasingly ineffective as policy dif-
ferences among coalition partners increase. Similarly, contracts have little impact if they are
in place and a one-party government supplants a preexisting multiparty coalition govern-
ment.6
Whereas most previous studies analyzing the impact of budgetary institutions on fiscal
policy outcomes focus on the direct of effect of budgetary institutions, we examine whether
the impact of budgetary institutions is conditioned by size fragmentation and political frag-
mentation. In other words: our analysis does not focus solely on the question whether bud-
getary institutions work, but (more importantly) under which political circumstances bud-
getary institutions work. The next section specifies our hypotheses in detail.
3 Hypotheses
As pointed out before, the effectiveness of budgetary institutions arguably depends on size
fragmentation. Theoretically, size fragmentation matters for fiscal policy because of the
common-pool problem according to which competing political groups vie for government
5There are also numerous studies on the impact of fiscal institutions in US states (see Besley and Case 2003,
for a survey, and Fatás and Mihov 2006 for a more recent contribution). A few studies refer to non-industrial
countries (e.g., Alesina et al. 1999). Recently, Dabla-Norris et al. (2010) constructed multi-dimensional in-
dices of the quality of budget institutions for 72 low-income and middle-income countries. They provide
evidence that sound budget institutions promote fiscal discipline, as measured by larger primary balances and
smaller debt.
6There is a related line of research focusing on the impact of numerical fiscal rules on fiscal policy outcomes
in EU member states. These numerical rules set targets and ceilings for fiscal aggregates or set benchmarks
for the conduct of fiscal policy. Ayuso-i-Casals et al. (2007) and Debrun et al. (2008) report that a more
extensive use of numerical rules and rules with a more effective design reduce the size of deficits.
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expenditures that are financed using broad-based tax revenues. A one-party government will
be more inclined to delegate power to a minister of finance who is from the same political
party. In contrast, a coalition government will not be inclined to delegate powers to a strong
minister of finance as the parties in the coalition will not be willing to delegate strong pow-
ers to a member of one of the other coalition parties. For the same reasons, delegation is
expected to be less effective in a coalition government than in a one-party government. So
our first hypothesis is:
Hypothesis 1 The larger the number of parties in government, the lower (higher) the effec-
tiveness of delegation (contracts) in the budgetary process will be.
Apart from the number of parties in government, Perotti and Kontopoulos (2002) also
take the number of spending ministers as an indicator of size fragmentation, arguing that
spending ministers will try to raise their department’s budget as much as they can, while
spreading the costs to the taxpayers. Arguably, the budgetary institutions in place will deter-
mine whether they succeed. Therefore we have as our second hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2 The larger the number of spending ministers in government, the lower
(higher) the effectiveness of delegation (contracts) in the budgetary process will be.
If political parties disagree on various basic policy issues, they are unlikely to delegate
important responsibilities to a finance minister as he could use his position to advance his
own party’s interests at the expense of other parties. Hallerberg et al. (2009) argue that
strengthening the formal powers of a finance minister when there are large ideological dif-
ferences among the coalition parties that are all needed to approve the budget will have little
practical effect. In contrast, contracts arguably work well if there are large ideological dif-
ferences among coalition parties as they make the terms of the budgetary agreement explicit.
The role of the finance minister is in that case reduced to enforcing the contract. Our third
hypothesis therefore is:
Hypothesis 3 The greater the political fragmentation of government, the lower (higher) the
effectiveness of delegation (contracts) in the budgetary process will be.
4 Data and model
4.1 The model
Our dependent variable is the cyclically adjusted primary budget balance as percentage of
GDP (source: OECD). This variable is denoted as Bal and is stationary according to most
panel unit root tests, which are reported in Table 1.
We estimate similar models to those of Debrun et al. (2008) and Hallerberg et al. (2009):
Bali,t = β0 + β1Bali,t−1 + β2Budi,t + β3Budi,t ∗ Poli,t +
∑
j
βjXj,i,t + εi,t , (1)
where Bud are the indicators of budgetary governance of Hallerberg et al. (2009), Pol are the
political variables that will be described below, and Xj are control variables. As indicated,
the model contains an interaction effect between the variable measuring budgetary institu-
tions and political variables. This implies that we are able to examine the effect of budget
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Table 1 Panel unit root tests on the dependent variable
Method Statistic Prob.** Countries Obs
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)
Levin, Lin & Chu t∗ −1.59 0.06 14 386
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat −2.70 0.00 14 386
ADF—Fisher Chi-square 51.69 0.00 14 386
PP—Fisher Chi-square 45.58 0.02 14 392
Null: No unit root (assumes common unit root process)
Hadri Z-stat 7.22 0.00 14 406
**Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi-square distribution. All other tests
assume asymptotic normality
institutions conditional on political variables. Our examination focuses on the question of the
levels of political and size fragmentation under which budgetary institutions work. There-
fore, we focus on the marginal effect of budget institutions for different levels of political
and size fragmentation. Below, we explain how the marginal effect of budget institutions is
calculated.
Following previous studies, the level of debt (as percentage of GDP), GDP growth, the
rate of inflation and a dummy for the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) are included as
economic control variables. Data for economic control variables have also been taken from
the OECD. As suggested by one of the referees, we have also included a dummy capturing
the collapse of communism. In addition, we include a proxy for the quality of the institutions
in the countries in our sample.
The control variables can be motivated as follows. In general, if a country has a high debt
level this will put pressure on governments to reduce deficits (Annett 2006; Hallerberg et al.
2009). The growth rate of real Gross Domestic Product is included to control for the effect
of the business cycle. Countries with slow growth are expected to experience a deterioration
of their budget balances as automatic stabilizers kick in (Hallerberg et al. 2009). However,
as we use cyclically adjusted fiscal data, GDP growth may be insignificant. Inflation may
affect government receipts and expenditures through nominal progression in tax rates and
tax brackets, and through price-indexation of receipts and expenditures. On the other hand,
unexpected inflation erodes the real value of nominal government debt so that the overall
effect of inflation on the budget balance is not clear a priori (Mink and de Haan 2006).7
To capture the possible impact of the introduction of the Stability and Growth Pact, we use
a dummy variable, which is one after the start of the SGP (1999) and zero otherwise. The
dummy capturing the fall of communism is zero until 1989 and one thereafter. Countries
with strong overall government institutions may exhibit greater fiscal discipline. Finally, it
is possible that these other institutions and not strong budgetary procedures really drive fiscal
performance. Failure to control for this could overstate the effect of budget institutions on
fiscal policy outcomes. To tackle this problem, we include a broad indicator of institutional
7For our sample of countries there is no reason to worry about reverse causality, i.e., excessive deficits cause
inflation. For instance, Fischer et al. (2002) show that fiscal policy leads to inflation only if deficits are above
some critical threshold, which the countries in our sample do not surpass.
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quality in the baseline regression. This variable is based on information provided by the
Fraser Institute. A higher value of this measure indicates better institutions.8
A problem that always potentially affects analyses like the one presented here is
endogeneity—the possibility that fiscal outcomes influence the evolution of budget insti-
tutions, rather than the other way around (Hallerberg et al. 2009). As we will show below,
budgetary institutions have changed in some countries in our sample and de Haan et al.
(1999) argue that in some European countries improvements in budget institutions have been
part of a larger package of fiscal consolidation. Likewise, Hallerberg et al. (2009) show that
a fiscal crisis has led to changes in budgetary institutions. However, in line with the work-
ing assumption in earlier papers, we maintain that budget institutions are relatively costly to
change and are stable over at least the short to medium term, as fiscal performance cannot
quickly feed back into altering institutions.
A second source of endogeneity can be due to the inclusion of both country specific
effects and a lagged dependent variable in our model, as the lagged dependent variable is
correlated with the error term (see Nickell 1981). This endogeneity holds particularly for
samples with a small time dimension (T ). Although in our case T = 20 and therefore the
Nickell bias is probably minor, we will also use GMM to check whether our results are
robust for endogeneity (see Sect. 5).
4.2 Budgetary institutions
Drawing heavily on Hallerberg et al. (2009), we first describe the underlying information and
then describe how this has been used to construct the Delegation Index and the Contracts
Index.
Hallerberg et al. (2009) have conducted various surveys of finance ministries, central
banks, and staff members of the budget committee in parliament to quantify the quality of
budgetary institutions in EU member states. They distinguish four dimensions: fiscal targets,
government negotiations, the parliamentary stage, and the execution phase. The maximum
score possible for each component is four, while the lowest possible score is zero.
The first dimension measures the extent to which a country uses multi-year budget plans
and comprises four components:
1. Is there is a multi-annual target, and, if so, what form does that target take? Countries
with no targets receive the lowest, those that focus on either total expenditures or total
taxes receive a medium, and those that have total budget size as their target receive the
highest score.
2. The time horizon of the plan, with a five-year plan receiving the highest score.
3. The nature of budget forecasts (are they ad hoc or regularly updated and based on a
consistent macroeconomic model?).
4. Commitment to multi-annual targets, where targets for internal orientation only receive
a low score, while strong political commitment receives the highest score.
The second dimension measures how the government prepares the budget submitted to
parliament. Again, there are four components:
8See: http://www.freetheworld.com. To be precise, we take the area 2 scores of the Economic Freedom in-
dex reflecting institutional quality, i.e., judicial independence, impartial courts, protection of property rights,
military interference with the rule of law and the political process, integrity of the legal system, legal en-
forcement of contracts, and regulatory restrictions on the sale of real property. The index ranges between zero
(poor institutions) to ten (good institutions).
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1. Is there a general constraint on the budget before the cabinet considers it? The tighter this
constraint, the higher the score will be for a given country.
2. The agenda setting power of the finance minister in government, where the lowest score
is given if the minister simply collects bids from spending ministers, while the highest
score is given if the finance minister (or prime minister) determines the budget parameters
for the spending ministers.
3. The scope of budget norms in the setting of the agenda, where a country earns the low-
est score if the norm concerns either expenditures or the deficit only, while the country
receives the highest score if the scope is broad.
4. The involvement of the finance minister in the structure of budget negotiations. A country
earns the lowest score if all ministers are involved in budget negotiations, and receives
the highest score if the negotiations take place bilaterally between a spending minister
and the minister of finance.
The third dimension measures the role of the parliament. There are five components:
1. If parliamentary amendments to the government’s budget are limited, the country re-
ceives the highest score, while if amendments are not limited the country gets the lowest
score.
2. If amendments must be offsetting, that is, if any increase in spending requires a concomi-
tant increase in revenues or decrease in spending in another field, the country is assigned
the highest score, while if the amendments are not required to be offsetting the score is
lowest.
3. If an amendment can cause the fall of the government, the country receives the highest
score, while if an amendment cannot lead to a fall in government the score is lowest.
4. Does the parliament first vote on the total size of the budget before it considers individual
items in the budget, or not?
5. Is there a global vote on total budget size?
The final dimension is the execution stage and here Hallerberg et al. (2009) focus on six
components:
1. Whether or not the finance minister has the power to block expenditures, where an affir-
mative answer receives the highest score and a negative answer the lowest score.
2. Are spending ministers subject to cash limits? If so, the country receives the highest
score.
3. Is disbursement approval required by the finance minister?
4. Are transfers of funds between chapters possible? Countries with unrestricted transfers
receive the lowest score, while countries where the transfers can only be within depart-
ments, and even then are subject to the finance minister’s consent, receive a top mark.
5. How easily can the government change the existing budget law? If the government can
make changes at its discretion, the country receives the lowest score, while if changes to
the budget law fall under the same regulations as the ordinary budget the country receives
the maximum score.
6. Carryover provisions to the following year; if the unused funds have no restrictions on
their carryover, the country receives the lowest score, while it receives the highest score
if carryovers are not possible.
The Delegation Index aggregates the cabinet, parliamentary, and implementation scores,
while the Contracts Index is the sum of the first dimension (multi-year budget plans) and two
parts of the implementation dimension—the ability of the finance minister to block changes
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Table 2 Budgetary Indicators (standardized)
Country Delegation index Contracts index
1991 2000 2004 1991 2000 2004
Austria 0.38 0.62 0.62 0.59 0.91 0.91
Belgium 0.23 0.44 0.51 0.12 0.75 0.75
Denmark 0.59 0.58 0.58 0.37 0.66 0.66
Finland 0.37 0.52 0.52 0.59 0.69 0.69
France 0.9 0.81 0.77 0.46 0.78 0.78
Germany 0.58 0.62 0.62 0.77 0.73 0.73
Greece 0.23 0.75 0.75 0.49 0.75 0.75
Ireland 0.35 0.77 0.77 0.58 0.75 0.75
Italy 0.27 0.73 0.69 0.34 0.66 0.66
Luxembourg 0.53 0.64 0.64 0.25 1 1
Netherlands 0.56 0.47 0.47 0.44 0.49 0.67
Portugal 0.49 0.54 0.60 0.19 0.69 0.69
Spain 0.27 0.58 0.58 0.23 0.53 0.53
Sweden 0.32 0.71 0.71 0.03 0.69 0.69
UK 0.74 0.87 0.87 0.52 0.74 0.74
Average 0.45 0.64 0.65 0.40 0.73 0.74
Source: Hallerberg et al. (2009)
to spending during implementation and the ability to transfer funds. Table 2 shows the in-
dicators summarizing the ideal types of delegation (DELEGATION) and contracts (CON-
TRACTS) at various points in time from Hallerberg et al. (2009). The indices are normalized
such that their values range from 0, indicating that a country has none of the attributes,
to 1, indicating that the country has all of the attributes. The Contracts Index, for instance,
is constructed by taking the weighted average of whether the finance minister can block a
proposal, whether funds can be transferred between departments and whether the budget
plan takes a long-run view, where the first two items get a weight of 25 % and the third a
weight of 50 %. The weighted average is dived by 4 (its theoretical maximum) to create the
index value reported in the table. For instance, in the case of Austria in 2004 the finance
minister could block all proposals (score 4), funds could not be transferred between depart-
ments (score 4) and there was a substantial long-term outlook (score 3.25). Aggregating the
weighted scores and dividing by four gives the value in the table.
Table 2 shows that budgetary institutions have changed over time. The table also reveals
much cross-country diversity. So our data have sufficient variation to enable testing the
hypotheses outlined in the previous section. Table 2 also shows that one potential objection
against our analysis, namely that countries may have those budgetary institutions that are
most effective in view of their political institutions, is not warranted. Take, for instance, the
case of the United Kingdom. Even though the United Kingdom until recently had one-party
majoritarian governments and according to Hallerberg et al. (2009) is therefore expected to
rely on delegation, the score for the Contracts Index is 0.74, only slightly below the score
for the Delegation Index. This may reflect changes, such as the Golden Rule, introduced
under the administration of Tony Blair. Another case in point is Germany, which is generally
governed by coalition governments, but has quite a high score for the Delegation Index. This
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may reflect that until the mid 1990s, German governments typically consisted of a senior and
a junior partner that were closely aligned.9
4.3 Political variables
We rely on the work of Mierau et al. (2007) to compile our political data, unless indicated
otherwise (all data are available on request). To test our first hypothesis we use an indicator
of size fragmentation of government, i.e., the effective number of political parties in gov-
ernment (see, Volkerink and de Haan 2001), and interact this variable with our budgetary
institution variables. To test our second hypothesis, we use an alternative indicator of size
fragmentation, namely the number of spending ministers, and again interact this variable
with our budgetary institution variables. This variable is calculated as the total size of the
cabinet minus the minister(s) of finance.
As an indicator of ideological differences among parties in government, we use the de-






× (IDEOLOGYj − PC)2
]
, (2)
where NMINj are the number of ministers from party j , whilst NMIN refers to the number
of ministers in government. IDEOLOGY indicates the ideological complexion of party j
and PC refers to the ideological position of the entire government. This indicator has been
suggested by Volkerink and de Haan (2001) as a proxy for political fragmentation. As an
alternative, we also employ the maximum ideological distance between the parties forming
a government. To test our third hypothesis, we focus on the interaction between the political
fragmentation variables and the two types of budgetary institutions. As both political vari-
ables are proxies for political fragmentation and are highly correlated, they are not included
simultaneously in the model.
Table 3 shows the correlation matrix of the variables used in our analysis. Note that both
budgetary indicators have a significant positive correlation of 0.47. The correlation between
the variables reflecting political fragmentation also is quite high, which is not surprising as
they are both proxies for ideological differences within government. However, the two mea-
sures reflecting size fragmentation hardly correlate. As expected all explanatory variables
show at least a moderate correlation with the dependent variable.
5 Results
Tables 4 and 5 show the estimation results of the models examining the impact of delegation
and fiscal contracts, respectively. The estimates are based on a panel data model including
country fixed effects.10 The sample includes all old ‘EU’ members apart from Luxembourg
9We thank one of the referees for pointing this out.
10Time effects are excluded, as they are generally insignificant throughout all specifications. We use a fixed
effects model despite the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable. Since the time dimension of the sample is
relatively large (T = 20), the so-called Nickell bias is likely to be small. In the next section, we also provide
results using the Blundell-Bond system GMM estimator. This does not alter our main findings.
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Table 4 The impact of delegation on the budget balance
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Lagged dependent
variable
0.698*** 0.692*** 0.679*** 0.667***
(14.93) (15.05) (14.63) (14.64)
Delegation 1.083 0.615 0.454 −2.526

































Economic growth 0.00221 0.00505 −0.00619 0.0161
(0.0439) (0.100) (−0.129) (0.327)
Government debt 0.0292*** 0.0288*** 0.0313*** 0.0282***
(3.964) (3.876) (4.193) (3.713)
Inflation 0.0707 0.0580 0.0652 0.0633
(1.227) (0.970) (1.113) (1.143)
Stability and Growth Pact 1.335*** 1.309*** 1.358*** 1.315***
(4.155) (4.001) (4.137) (4.079)
Fall of communism −1.056*** −1.054*** −1.137*** −1.146***
(−3.520) (−3.564) (−3.781) (−3.778)
Institutional quality 0.398** 0.406** 0.487** 0.532***
(2.137) (2.215) (2.536) (2.943)
Constant −5.468*** −4.988** −5.067*** −1.927
(−2.901) (−2.575) (−2.686) (−0.828)
Observations 252 252 252 252
Within R-squared 0.719 0.722 0.725 0.728
Countries 14 14 14 14
Notes: Robust t-statistics in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
and covers the time span 1984–2003.11 We enter each of the political variables and its inter-
11Unfortunately, there is not sufficient variation in terms of newer versus older EU member nations in our
sample to make a meaningful comparison between them. In our sample, only three countries became part
of the EU, i.e., Spain, Portugal and Sweden. The first two countries entered the EU in 1986, right after our
sample period starts, so that the only effective change was the entry of Sweden in 1995.
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Table 5 The impact of contracts on the budget balance
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Lagged dependent
variable
0.689*** 0.675*** 0.682*** 0.664***
(14.70) (13.93) (14.35) (14.27)
Contracts 0.411 −0.179 −0.159 1.105

































Economic growth −0.00211 0.00621 0.00207 0.0158
(−0.0434) (0.129) (0.0425) (0.322)
Government debt 0.0307*** 0.0314*** 0.0317*** 0.0319***
(4.229) (4.429) (4.391) (4.341)
Inflation 0.0529 0.0368 0.0455 0.0626
(1.025) (0.708) (0.850) (1.211)
Stability and Growth Pact 1.336*** 1.255*** 1.361*** 1.334***
(4.154) (3.893) (4.140) (4.145)
Fall of communism −1.168*** −1.171*** −1.210*** −1.232***
(−3.704) (−3.709) (−3.713) (−3.818)
Institutional quality 0.466** 0.511*** 0.519** 0.504***
(2.453) (2.643) (2.586) (2.728)
Constant −5.556*** −5.371*** −5.095*** −3.861*
(−3.125) (−3.024) (−2.848) (−1.741)
Observations 252 252 252 252
Within R-squared 0.727 0.732 0.726 0.729
Countries 14 14 14 14
Notes: Robust t-statistics in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
action with our budgetary indicators to test our hypotheses. To evaluate the marginal effect
of budgetary institutions on the budget balance, we calculate point estimates and standard
errors for every value of the political variables as suggested by Brambor et al. (2006). These
are shown in Figs. 1, 2, 3, 4.
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Fig. 1 The effect of budgetary institutions on the budget balance (Hypotheses 1 and 2)
Both tables show that the significant control variables have the expected sign. The lagged
budget balance, the level of public debt, the SGP dummy, the fall of communism dummy,
and the institutional quality measure are generally significant in the different model specifi-
cations, while growth and inflation are not significant.
To interpret the effect of the budgetary institutions on the budget balance, we present in
Figs. 1, 2, 3, 4 so-called marginal effect plots, following Brambor et al. (2006). These plots
examine whether the effect of budgetary institutions is conditioned by political variables
and show for every value of the conditioning variable the point estimate as well as the 95 %
confidence interval of the impact of the budgetary institution. The marginal effects, M̂E, and
the standard errors, σˆ , are calculated as follows:
M̂E = ∂Bal
∂Bud
= βˆ2 + βˆ3 ∗ Pol, (3a)
σˆ =
√
var(βˆ2) + var(βˆ3) + 2 ∗ Pol ∗ cov(βˆ2, βˆ3), (3b)
where hats indicate the sample estimates.
Figure 1 shows the plots related to Hypotheses 1 and 2, i.e., the conditioning effect of
size fragmentation on the impact of budgetary institutions on the government’s budget bal-
ance. The point estimates are generally increasing when size fragmentation is proxied by the
effective number of parties in government. However, in contrast to what we expected, we
find that both delegation and contracts become (marginally) effective when the number of
parties in government increases. Therefore, Hypothesis 1 is (partly) rejected. Furthermore,
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Fig. 2 The effect of budgetary institutions on the budget balance (Hypothesis 3)
the effect of the number of spending ministers on the budget balance is not significant in case
of delegation. However, the effect of contracts on the budget balance is positive for some
values of the number of spending ministers. Yet, the estimated marginal effect is relatively
constant. Therefore, we also partly reject Hypothesis 2.
Figure 2 shows the impact of our budgetary indicators on the government’s budget bal-
ance, conditional on our two proxies for political fragmentation. In contrast to Hypothesis 3,
no matter whether fiscal governance is based on delegation to a strong minister of finance or
on fiscal contracts, the marginal effect lines are upward sloping and the effect is significant
(except for the figure in the upper left quadrant) in case of strong ideological fragmentation.
This implies that the impact of budgetary institutions (contract and delegation) on the bud-
get balance becomes stronger in the presence of greater political fragmentation. This result
shows up for both indicators of ideological differences within government. These findings
are in line with the view of Dixit et al. (1997) that both forms of budgetary institutions can
complement each other.
6 Sensitivity analysis
To examine the robustness of our results, we estimated our model also using the Blundell and
Bond (1998) dynamic panel system GMM estimator. Although the time dimension of our
sample is relatively long, a small bias might arise due to the inclusion of a lagged dependent
variable and country specific effects. To minimize the number of instruments, we collapse
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Fig. 3 The effect of budgetary institutions on the budget balance using GMM (Hypotheses 1 and 2)
them as suggested by Roodman (2009) and restrict the number of lagged instruments to
two. All specifications were tested on the presence of autocorrelation using the Arellano
and Bond AR(1) test. These tests did not indicate autocorrelation. The models also passed
the Sargan test and the Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions. Finally, the standard
errors are calculated using the Windmeijer (2005) finite sample correction.
As shown by Figs. 3 and 4, the main results are very similar to the results reported above.
Budgetary institutions, no matter whether they are based on delegation to a strong minister of
finance or on fiscal contracts, become significant in case of strong ideological fragmentation,
thereby mitigating the impact of political fragmentation. In contrast, the impact of budgetary
institutions is not conditioned by size fragmentation. Although the marginal effect lines are
upward sloping in three cases, the effect does not become significant, nor does it if size
fragmentation is proxied by the number of parties in government.
7 Concluding comments
In this paper we analyze how budgetary institutions affect fiscal policy outcomes in mem-
ber states of the European Union over the period 1984–2004 using new indicators pro-
vided by Hallerberg et al. (2009). According to Hallerberg et al. (2009), there are two ideal
forms of fiscal governance that can effectively deal with the common pool problem, namely
delegation and contracts. Under delegation the finance minister is vested with significant
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Fig. 4 The effect of budgetary institutions on the budget balance using GMM (Hypothesis 3)
decision-making powers, while under contracts political parties enter an agreement to com-
mit themselves strictly to budgetary targets set for one or several years. Both ideal forms
of fiscal governance centralize the budget process, but the effectiveness of these budgetary
institutions may depend on the characteristics of the political system. Using panel fixed
effects models, we examine whether the impact of budgetary institutions on the govern-
ment budget balance is conditioned by size and political fragmentation. Our main find-
ings are that budgetary institutions, no matter whether they are based on delegation to a
strong minister of finance or on fiscal contracts, become significant and decrease budget
deficits when ideological fragmentation is strong. In contrast, the impact of budgetary in-
stitutions is not conditioned by size fragmentation, no matter whether size fragmentation
is measured by the number of parties in a coalition or the number of spending ministers.
So our findings suggest that better budgetary institutions may help improve fiscal disci-
pline in EU member states that are governed by coalitions that are highly fragmented polit-
ically.
The purpose of our paper is not to examine the political economy drivers of changes in
budgetary institutions. Still, our results suggest that better budgetary institutions may help
maintain fiscal discipline so that it is an important issue for future research to examine the
conditions under which reform of budgetary institutions will be introduced. Perhaps the
external pressure due to the debt crisis in the euro area will provide the right incentives for
improvements, as crises are known to be important impetuses for reform (Hallerberg et al.
2009). Likewise, international policy diffusion may stimulate reforms as well (cf. Pitlik
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2007). Finally, as more information increases support for reform (Boeri and Tabellini 2012),
the results of our research may strengthen support for the reform of budgetary institutions.
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